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1. Introduction 
Environmental regulations have long been of considerable policy interest, and remain controversial. 
Supporters of regulatory controls point to significant health benefits associated with reductions in 
environmental pollution, while critics blame environmental regulations for productivity drops, job 
losses, and relocation of manufacturers. For both sides of the argument, a critical question relates to 
how firms respond to environmental regulation. Empirical contributions in this area have sought to 
quantify such response (Henderson, 1996; Becker and Henderson, 2000; List et al., 2003b). But the 
existing literature has paid little attention to the role of a firm’s plant structure. Because multi-plant 
firms may behave differently than single-plant firms, multi-plant firms’ decisions about relocation, in 
response to regulatory controls, may impact the effectiveness of environmental regulations. They also 
have the potential to play a major role in the dynamics of employment, evolution of regional 
economies, and restructuring of industry. This is relevant because multi-plant firms account for a large 
share of U.S. manufacturing activities—as noted by Bernard and Jensen (2007), they employ 78% of 
the manufacturing workforce and produce 88% of the output. Multi-plant firms are also more likely 
to have emission above the critical level that triggers the need for regulatory compliance (Becker and 
Henderson, 2000).  
In this paper, we follow Bernard and Jensen (2007) by focusing squarely on the probability of 
plant death, and investigate a channel that was not investigated in their analysis. Specifically, we study 
the impact of environmental regulation on plant death: the extent to which stringent regulation leads 
“dirty” plants to exit an industry. In the process, the effects on plant closure of plant attributes, local 
agglomeration, and some county characteristics are investigated as well. Second, we examine whether 
multi-plant firms are more or less likely to shut down affiliated plants in response to stringent 
regulatory controls. Moreover, information on existing plants affiliated with the same headquarter is 
used to investigate the role of firms’ internal network. We measure internal network effects at three 
different regional levels: local, neighborhood, and the wider area, and we examine how these internal 
network effects interact with exposure to environmental regulations. We further decompose the 
neighborhood network into those in regulated and unregulated neighboring counties, and examine 
how these network measures affect closure decisions of dirty plants (relative to clean ones) affiliated 
with multi-plant firms. 
The particular empirical focus of this paper on the role of multi-plant firms, and their internal 
structure, is motivated by the theoretical ambiguity of how differently multi-plant firms, relative to 
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single-plant firms, may respond to external pressure affecting profitability (Bernard and Jensen, 2007). 
In our context, multi-plant firms may exercise their greater flexibility in different ways. The availability 
of multiple plants may reduce the closure probability of a given plant because the firm may abate 
pollution by reallocating production activities across plants. Alternatively, a multi-plant firm may use 
plant shutdown as the margin of adjustment to comply with environmental regulation. The costs of a 
plant’s closure are lessened by the ability to shift production activities (and associated jobs) from plants 
in regulated areas to plants in unregulated areas. The consequences of plant closure are clearly less 
draconian for multi-plant firms—closure does not imply the end of the firm. The options available to 
single-plant firms in regulated areas, on the other hand, are more limited.  
To carry out the empirical analysis outlined in the foregoing, we compile a unique detailed plant-
level dataset for the U.S. manufacturing sector from 1990 to 2008. To measure plants’ exposure to 
environmental compliance costs, we match plant-level data with county nonattainment/attainment 
designations under the Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) legislation of 1990. By exploiting the 
spatial and time variations of the CAAA, we estimate the heterogeneous responses of multi-plant firms 
and single-plant firms to county nonattainment designations. In particular, we propose a triple 
difference-in-difference model with interaction among a dirty industry dummy, a county regulation 
indicator, and the regional firm internal network that varies with exposure to environmental pressures. 
We obtain some novel and interesting results. First, conditional on plant attributes and county 
characteristics, we find that nonattainment status under the CAAA legislation leads to some exit of 
dirty plants in regulated areas. Moreover, we find that multi-plant firms are more likely to close plants 
in regulated counties as compared to single-plant firms. The closure probability is positively correlated 
with the plant’s distance to the headquarters and the number of existing similar plants affiliated with 
the same parent company. Second, with respect to firms’ internal network effects, we find that the 
effects of regulation vary with the network level. At the neighborhood level, the larger the number of 
affiliated plants located in counties sharing borders with the regulated county, the more likely an 
affiliated dirty plant in the regulated county is to be closed. Third, when conditioning on the neighbor 
network effect by its exposure to environmental pressures, we find that the presence of more sibling 
plants residing in neighboring counties that are free from regulatory controls is associated with a higher 
closure probability of dirty plants in regulated counties. Such internal network effects in regulated 
neighboring counties are more pronounced in the post-CAAA period of 1990–1999.   
This paper contributes to the empirical literature that studies the impact of environmental 
regulations on firms’ site choices (Jeppesen et al., 2002; Brunnermeier and Levinson, 2004). One line 
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of studies uses region-level data to examine the effects of regulatory controls on plant births. Using 
county-level data on plant birth from the U.S. Census Bureau during 1963–1992, Henderson (1996) 
shows that the ground-level ozone nonattainment regulation leads to the relocation of polluting plants 
from more to less polluted areas. The follow-up study by Becker and Henderson (2000) further 
distinguishes the county-level plant births by corporate and nonaffiliated sectors. Whereas the former 
refers to multi-plant firms, the latter indicates single-plant firms. They find a shift in plant births from 
the more regulated multi-plant firms to the less regulated single-plant firms. List et al. (2003) revisit 
the conjecture of a negative correlation between environmental regulation and manufacturing plant 
birth. Using a county-level dataset for the State of New York from 1980 to 1990, their empirical 
estimates suggest that pollution-intensive plants adversely respond to county nonattainment 
designations. Using county-level data, List, McHone, and Millimet (2004) examine the heterogeneous 
effects of environmental regulations on plant birth decisions for domestic and foreign plants. They 
find evidence that domestic plants are responsive to environmental regulations, while foreign plants 
are not. These authors also investigate the impacts of environmental regulation stringency on site 
choices of relocating plants (List, McHone, and Millimet, 2003). 
Another line of inquiry employs plant-level data to examine the effects of regulation stringency 
on plant location choices. Levinson (1996) considers six environmental regulatory measures for single-
plant firms and branches of the 500 largest multi-plant manufacturers, and finds little evidence about 
the negative impacts of stringent state-level environmental regulations on plant births. List and Co 
(2000) focus on the state-level environmental regulatory effects on foreign multinational corporations’ 
new plant site choices from 1986 to 1993, and document a negative relationship between 
environmental stringency and plant birth. Tole and Koop (2010) examine the effects of environmental 
standards on plant birth decisions of gold mining multinationals across countries.  
This paper also adds to the literature in empirical industrial organization that examines the role 
of firm attributes in determining firms’ site choices.1 Using plant-level data from the Censuses of 
Manufactures from 1987 to 1997, Bernard and Jensen (2007) find that plants affiliated with multi-
plant firms or with U.S.-based multinationals have significantly greater chances of being shutdown, 
controlling for plant attributes. Similarly, Kneller et al. (2012), based on Japanese plant-level data, find 
that plants belonging to multi-plant firms are more vulnerable to closure compared with similar single-
                                                        
1 Related studies focus on relocation decisions of headquarters within the nation (Lovely, Rosenthal, and 
Sharma, 2005; Davis and Henderson, 2008; Henderson and Ono, 2008; Strauss-Kahn and Vives, 2009) and 
across countries (Voget, 2011). 
 4
plant firms. Moreover, they show that multi-plant multinationals are even more likely to shut down 
their affiliated plants. By contrast, this paper aims to highlight the role of firms’ internal structure in 
response to stringent environmental controls. As such, our work is also related to recent research 
examining how firms spread the impacts of local shocks across regions through their internal network 
of affiliated plants. Local positive investment shocks in Giroud and Mueller (2015) are measured by 
the introduction of new airline routes between headquarters and affiliated plants, whereas Giroud and 
Mueller (2017) study local negative employment shocks by exploiting the regional variations in house 
prices during the Great Recession. In our context, the local shock of interest is the changing stringency 
of environmental regulation.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly summarizes the CAAA 
environmental regulation. Section 3 presents data sources and variables construction. Section 4 
provides empirical strategy and descriptive statistics. Section 5 presents results and robustness checks. 
Section 6 concludes. 
2. Environmental Regulation 
The CAAA of 1990 requires the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to classify each county 
into pollutant-specific nonattainment and attainment categories, based upon the ambient 
concentrations of four criteria air pollutants: SO2, CO, O3, and TSPs. Each July, the EPA officially 
reclassifies the pollutant-specific nonattainment/attainment designation for every U.S. county.  
The county nonattainment designation serves as an indicator of a plant’s exposure to stringent 
environmental regulations. This exposure varies with both pollutant type and plant characteristics. 
When a county is designated as nonattainment status for a pollutant, the state where the county is 
located is required to develop a State Implementation Plan that lays out specific regulations for every 
major source of the pollutant for the nonattainment county. The stringency of regulatory controls 
differs between existing and new plants. Whereas the former is subject to reasonably available control 
technology involving the retrofitting of existing equipment, the latter is exposed to the “lowest 
achievable emission rate” (LAER), which requires the installation of the cleanest available technology. 
In sharp contrast, when a county is classified into the attainment category, existing plants are not 
subject to any technological standards, and new small plants are exempt from the regulation. Only the 
so-called class-A new polluters, those with the potential to emit over 100 tons per year of a criteria air 
pollutant, are required to comply with the “best available control technology” standard, a weaker 
standard than LAER. 
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3. Data 
The data pertain to the U.S. manufacturing sector from 1990 to 2008. We assemble these data from a 
variety of sources. The plant-level data are from the National Establishment Time Series (NETS) 
database.2 The county-level environmental regulation is obtained from the EPA. The Census Bureau 
provides the County Business Pattern (CBP) data and the Business Dynamics Statistics (BDS). The 
former allows us to construct county-by-industry characteristics, while the latter is used to create 
measures for the industry-level entry and exit rates. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) supplies the 
county-level labor force data and the industry-level Producer Price Index (PPI).3 
The NETS database, developed by Walls and Associates through a joint venture with Dun and 
Bradstreet, covers over 300 fields and 40 million unique business establishments on a national basis 
for each year since 1990. The plant-level data in the NETS database include a handful of variables 
capturing plants’ industrial activities, including the number of employees, the value of sales, an 
indicator of whether or not it exports, and the four-digit SIC industry code. To keep track of each 
plant, NETS assigns the Data Universal Numbering System (DUNS) number as a unique identifier. 
It also provides plants’ geographic address and (re)location information including the five-digit Federal 
Information Processing Standard county code, as well as the first and last year in which a plant 
conducted business. More importantly, the NETS database also provides headquarters information 
for each plant, specifically the headquarters’ names, DUNS numbers, and geographic locations.  
To create our unique sample of plants with environmental interests, we link the NETS database 
to the National Emission Inventory (NEI) of the EPA.4 The NEI database contains information 
about plants that emit criteria air pollutants for all areas of the United States. We match these recorded 
polluting plants with those collected in the NETS database. For each matched plant, we then find its 
related plants within the NETS database through the parent company for the entire study period. We 
restrict our search to those in manufacturing industries. Furthermore, we merge the plant-level data 
                                                        
2 NETS data have been used to study issues related to business relocation and business ownership (Rosenthal 
and Strange, 2003; Kolko and Neumark, 2008, 2010; Neumark, Wall, and Zhang, 2011). Neumark, Wall, and 
Zhang (2011) provide a detailed description of the NETS and an assessment of the quality of the NETS 
database along many dimensions, including measurement of employment data, capture of birth, death, and 
relocation, and linkages of plants to their parent company. 
 
3 Since 2004, the industry-level data is reported on the three-digit NAICS industry level. We convert the three-
digit NAICS industry to the two-digit SIC industry to make it consistent with the data prior to 2004. 
 
4 Cui, Lapan, and Moschini (2016) discuss the details of the procedure linking the NEI and NETS databases. 
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with pollutant-specific county nonattainment designations under the CAAA legislation. The Green 
Book Nonattainment Areas for Criteria Pollutants from the EPA indicates whether only part of a 
county or the whole county is in nonattainment for each criteria air pollutant.5 For each of four criteria 
pollutants (CO, SO2, O3, and TSPs), we assign a county to the nonattainment category if the whole 
county or part of the county is designated with nonattainment status.6 
Figure 1 plots the number of counties with nonattainment status and the number of counties 
with changed nonattainment status for any criteria air pollutants from 1978 to 2014.7 The data are 
calculated from the EPA Green Book. The number of counties with nonattainment designations 
drops steadily from over 800 in the late 1970s, when the CAAA was implemented, to around 300 in 
2002. Due to the implementation of strict standards for TSPs and ground-level O3, the total number 
of nonattainment counties jumps back to about 500 around 2004. Moreover, in comparison to our 
sample period of 1990–2008, there exists substantial variations in county-level 
nonattainment/attainment designations in both earlier and later sample periods, allowing us to identify 
the effects of county-level environmental controls on plant closure decisions. 
We look closely at the pollutant-specific nonattainment designations. Figure 2 decomposes the 
information provided by Figure 1 for each individual pollutant. For SO2, variations in nonattainment 
status are stable during the study period of 1990–2008. For CO, there are substantial variations during 
the period of 1990–2002. For O3 and TSPs, significant changes in nonattainment designations mainly 
occur post-CAAA (i.e., 1990–1996) and the late sample period (i.e., 2002–2008). The latter is due to 
the new implementation of strict standards associated with these two pollutants. 
3.1 Variables 
Table 1 provides a complete list and brief descriptions of variables used in this study, including the 
outcome variable and other variables of interest that may be influential factors in determining plants’ 
site choices.  
                                                        
5 See http://www.epa.gov/air/oaqps/greenbk/index.html. 
 
6  The formation of ground-level O3 is a complicated chemical process that involves Volatile Organic 
Compounds (VOCs) and Oxide of Nitrogen (NOx) when these two react in the presence of sunlight. We 
classify a county as nonattainment for O3 if it is in nonattainment for NOx and/or O3, including both one-
hour and eight-hour standards. In the case of TSPs, a county is defined as TSPs-specific nonattainment when 
it is in nonattainment for PM10 and/or PM2.5. 
 
7 For variations in pollutant-specific nonattainment designations at county level, see Figure 3 in the Appendix. 
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The variable Death is an indicator variable that identifies the year in which a plant shuts down. If 
a plant is shut down in year 1t  , the NETS database then puts t  in the category of the “last year” 
when business was still active. Hence, for plant i in year t this variable is defined as: 
 +1
, if the last active year is 
, otherwise
1
0it
t
Death  
Multi is an indicator variable that identifies whether plant i in year t belongs to a multi-plant firm, 
(i.e., if there exists at least one other plant that shares the same headquarter DUNS number) it is a 
single-plant firm otherwise. Note that the multi-plant affiliation status may vary with time due to 
changes in plant ownership. Hence: 
 
, if there exists another plant with the same headquarter's DUNS number
, otherwise
1
0it
Multi  
To assess the effects of being associated with multi-plant firms, we create three distinct metrics 
of a firm’s internal network, based upon the number of affiliated plants across regions. For a plant i  
operating in industry j  and located in county c , let LijctN  denote the number of other plants affiliated 
with the same firm that also operate in industry j  and are located in county c   in year t . Similarly, let 
N
ijctN  denote the number of other plants affiliated with the same firm that also operate in industry j , 
but which are located in neighboring counties (i.e., counties that share a border with county c ). Let 
W
ijctN  denote the number of other plants affiliated with the same firm that also operate in industry j  
but are located outside county c  and its immediate neighborhood. For single-plant firms, of course, 
0L N Wijct ijct ijctN N N   . Given that, we define the local network variable ijctLocalNet , the 
neighborhood network variable ijctNbrNet , and the wider-area network variable ijctWideNet  as: 
  ln 1 Lijct ijctLocalNet N    
  ln 1 Nijct ijctNbrNet N    
  ln 1 Wijct ijctWideNet N   
We further distinguish the firm’s internal network in neighboring counties into regulated and 
unregulated regions. Let RNijctN  and UNijctN  denote the number of neighborhood plants associated with 
the same firm that are located in regulated or unregulated neighboring counties, respectively. Regulated 
counties here means those designated with at least one pollutant-specific nonattainment status (by 
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construction, therefore, RN UN Nijct ijct ijctN N N  ). We define the regulated and unregulated neighborhood 
network variables, respectively, as: 
  ln 1 RNijct ijctRegNbrNet N    
  ln 1 UNijct ijctUnregNbrNet N   
The unregulated neighborhood network effect is more likely to trigger the death decision for plant i  
in the regulated county c than the regulated neighborhood network, because the former requires less 
cost of resources reallocation from the plant i  in the regulated county c to other affiliated plants in 
the neighborhood counties free from regulation that the latter demands. 
For each plant affiliated with a multi-plant firm, the variable itDistance is defined as the (log) 
distance of plant i  to the firm’s headquarters. This variable provides another measure controlling for 
the impacts of strategic decisions made by a parent company on its affiliated plants. The variable 
itMultiIndustry  is defined as the number of two-digit SIC industries in which a firm has associated 
plants at time t.  
To control for the possible impacts of ownership changes, we define the variable itTakeover  as 
an indicator variable that flags the year ownership changes, which for us is defined as when a firm’s 
headquarter’s DUNS number changes at time t. That is: 
 
, if headquarter's DUNS headquarter's DUNS  
, otherwise
11
0
it it
itTakeover  
In some cases, plants may switch between multi-plant and single-plant affiliation status due to mergers 
and acquisitions. Unfortunately, the NETS database does not provide further information about types 
of ownership changes.  
The variable ctReg  is our measure of a plant’s environmental regulatory pressure, which we 
define as an indicator variable that denotes a county designated as having nonattainment status for at 
least one of the four air pollutants in year t . That is: 
,  if county  is nonattainment for at least one criteria air pollutants 
, otherwise
1
0ct
c
Reg  
 
This regulation variable is also noted as “Any NA” in what follows. To check the robustness of results, 
we consider pollutant-specific nonattainment designations as alternative measures by analogously 
defining the variable pctReg  separately for each pollutant  2 3, , ,p SO CO O TSPs .  
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Let AijctN  denote the number of existing plants located in the same county and industry as plant 
i , but outside of the firm’s internal network. Then the variable  ln 1 Aijct ijctAgglomeration N   is 
used to proxy for local agglomeration.  
To identify the role of firms’ internal network in manufacturing site choices, we also add a 
handful of plant characteristics controls. Both existing theoretical and empirical studies suggest that 
plant age plays an important role in determining plant death. We define Age as plant years of operation, 
specifically as the difference between the current year and the first recorded NETS year, starting from 
1990. Plants that are in their first recorded year are given an age of one. Plant Size, measured by the 
log number of employees, is included as well. In addition, plants’ log values of deflated sales per labor 
is added as a raw measure for Labor productivity at the plant level. 
As predicted by Melitz-type trade models (Melitz, 2003), productive plants are, ceteris paribus, 
more likely to export than lower productivity plants due to the interaction between heterogeneous 
productivity and fixed costs of exporting. This positive correlation between export decision and 
productivity has been documented in the empirical trade work (Bernard and Jensen, 2004). In addition, 
the literature examining heterogeneous firms and outsourcing also suggests causality in high 
productivity and outsourcing decisions (Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple, 2004; Tomiura, 2007). To 
further control unobservable productivity, we include an Export Status indicator and Foreign Ownership 
indicator. The former equals one when a plant exports and zero otherwise, while the latter takes a 
value of one if a plant is owned by a foreign firm and zero otherwise. These two binary variables are 
time-invariant, as provided in the NETS database. 
For robustness, we further control for industry and geographic factors that may cause variations 
in plants’ shutdown decisions. The measure of county-level tax rates is the median real estate taxes by 
county in 2005 obtained from the American Community Survey (ACS). Another county-level variable 
is road density, which is measured by the road length of six different road categories per land area.8 
This variable helps proxy the effects of local infrastructure on location decisions of manufacturers. 
To examine the local labor costs over the study period, we account for the county-level unemployment 
                                                        
8 The ArcGIS provides a detailed U.S. road map covering from all interstate highways to important local roads. 
This map defines six road categories: (1) freeway or other major road, (2) major road less important than a 
freeway, (3) other major road, (4) secondary road, (5) local connecting road, and (6) important local road. We 
calculate the county-level road length, using the tool box of “intersect” in the ArcGIS software. This tool box 
helps us compute the length of each road cut by county boundary. For each county, we then add up the road 
length by six different road categories with equal weights for all categories except the interstate highway, which 
includes two-way traffic. 
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rate from the BLS. We also construct industry-by-county wage rate based on the ratio of annual payroll 
and employment. 
 The magnitude of sunk entry costs is important in determining the steady-state equilibrium rate 
of firm birth and death within an industry. In attempt to measure the unobserved entry costs, the 
minimum of industry entry and exit rates used in Bernard and Jensen (2007) is implemented in the 
regression. That is,  1 min ,jt jt jtEntryCost entryrate exitrate  . The entry and exit rates computed 
from the BDS are measured at the three-digit SIC industry level. Finally, to control for unobserved 
industry heterogeneity, we include a full set of industry linear trends. State linear trends are also added 
to absorb unobservable state characteristics varying with time.  
3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Our data sample is an unbalanced panel with more than 1.2 million plant-by-year observations over 
the 1990–2008 period. These observations are obtained from 153,582 unique plants affiliated with 
44,069 unique headquarters. 
Table 2 provides summary statistics for the main variables used in the analysis. The value of sales 
is deflated by the two-digit SIC industry PPI. Approximately 80% of observations are plants affiliated 
with multi-plant firms, while the remaining are owned by single-plant firms. The last two columns of 
Table 2 summarize the mean differences between multi-plant and single-plant status across plant 
characteristics. Plants that belong to multi-plant firms are larger than those with single-plant firms in 
terms of larger value of sales and more employees. However, relative to the latter, plants of multi-
plant firms have lower labor productivity measured by deflated sales per worker. When location 
decisions are concerned, plants affiliated with multi-plant firms have higher death and takeover rates 
than those with single-plant firms. In addition, compared with single-plant firms, multi-plant firms 
have a relatively higher fraction of plants owned by foreign companies, but a lower fraction of 
exporting plants. When it comes to the exposure to environmental regulations, the fraction of single-
plant firms in counties that are in nonattainment status for at least one pollutant is larger than that of 
multi-plant firms residing in nonattainment counties. This result holds for all four different pollutant-
specific regulations, except SO2 nonattainment designation. 
Table 3 provides mean values for plant attributes by firm structure and county nonattainment 
status. For instance, plants being part of single-plant firms and located in any nonattainment counties, 
on average, have 77 employees. Several interesting points arise from Table 3. First, for each type of 
firm ownership, either single-plant or multi-plant, the number of plants located in nonattainment 
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counties is larger than that residing in counties free from environmental regulations. This indicates 
that a substantial fraction of plants are subject to regulatory burdens. Second, plant size differs by 
exposure to environmental pressures. Regardless of multi-plant status, plants residing in 
nonattainment counties are younger and smaller in size (in terms of the number of employees), but 
have higher labor productivity (deflated sales per worker) than those exempt from environmental 
burdens. Third, regardless of multi-plant ownership, plants located in nonattainment counties have 
higher death rate, but slightly lower takeover rates than those in attainment counties. When comparing 
plants located in nonattainment counties, but differing in multi-plant status, multi-plant firms tend to 
have larger death and takeover rates relative to similar single-plant firms. Lastly, multi-plant firms have, 
on average, more subsidiaries located in nonattainment counties than in attainment counties.  
To further investigate plant death rates by multi-plant status and environmental exposure, we 
compute average plant death rate at county-level by multi-plant status for each year. For each county-
year pair, death rate is computed as the number of plant deaths divided by the number of existing 
plants across multi-plant status. Then, for each year we take the mean value of county-level death rates 
by nonattainment status. Figure 4 shows that, regardless of environmental pressures, multi-plant firms 
have much higher death rates than single-plant firms over our study period of 1990–2008. When it 
comes to regulatory exposure, death rates of plants located in nonattainment and attainment counties 
follow a similar pattern. Moreover, plants located in nonattainment counties have modestly higher 
death rates than those residing in attainment counties across years. 
4. Empirical Models 
We seek to examine whether, in response to local stringent environmental controls, multi-plant firms 
are more or less likely to close an affiliated plant in regulated counties than single-plant firms. Also, 
among multi-plant firms, we are interested in identifying the heterogeneous effects of the firm’s 
internal network characteristics on closure decisions of affiliated dirty plants that are exposed to 
environmental pressures. Moreover, we investigate how the structure of firms’ internal network in 
terms of exposure to environmental pressures, affects the shutdown decisions of dirty plants relative 
to clean plants in response to tightened local regulatory controls. 
To identify the heterogeneous effects of CAAA regulation on plant closure decisions, we 
estimate a series of probit models that represent the probability of plant death. The general structure 
of these probit models can be represented as follows:  
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    it it it cjtProb Death X Z         (1) 
The outcome indicator variable itDeath  was defined earlier, and ( )   denotes the cumulative 
distribution function of the normal distribution. As noted earlier, i  indexes a plant, j   indicates the 
industry of said plant, c  is the county where the plant is located, and t  denotes the observation year. 
In equation (1), itX  is a vector of regulatory and network variables that we wish to single out in our 
analysis, itZ  is a vector of other explanatory and control variables (including plant characteristics), and 
cjt  is a vector of fixed effects that control for county, industry, and time factors common to all 
plants within the same county (such as county-level regulation, the measure of agglomeration 
economies, and industry-by-county wage rate). The various models considered below have the 
structure of equation (1) and differ in the details of the specification of the term itX  .  
4.1 Multi-plant vs. Single-plant Death	
We explore the role of firms’ internal networks in determining plants’ responses to stringent 
environmental regulations, controlling for plant, county, and industry characteristics. We test whether 
a multi-plant firm, in response to tightened environmental controls, is more or less likely to shut down 
its affiliated plants than a single-plant firm. Moreover, we distinguish firms’ internal network effects 
with local agglomeration by utilizing the variables discussed earlier. We also consider how plant 
attributes, including size, age, labor productivity, and other characteristics, are related to their 
likelihood of shutting down. The county-level characteristics are also included to control for 
confounding factors affecting the closure decisions of plants. The structural part of the probit model 
for this analysis can be represented as 
 11 1 1it ct itX Reg Multi                      (2) 
Note that because the EPA determination of nonattainment status is made in July of any given year, 
our presumption is that the shutdown probability in year t  is related to the status in place at the 
beginning of the year (which was determined in July of year 1t  ). The parameter of interest, 11 , is 
the coefficient for the interaction term between the regulation variable ctReg and multi-plant 
ownership dummy itMulti . This parameter captures the heterogeneous regulatory impacts on multi-
plant closure decisions relative to those with single-plant firms, controlling for local agglomeration 
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effects and county and industry characteristics. 
4.2 Firm Internal Network 
As sketched in a heuristic map in Figure 3, plants affiliated with the same parent company are located 
across counties; and hence, in principle, are subject to variations in local environmental pressures. 
When considering the possibility of reallocating resources from plants in regulated counties to 
affiliated plants in unregulated counties, reallocation costs may vary with the distance between the 
regulated plant and its affiliated plants. The distribution of sibling plants in different regional levels 
may have different impacts on the probability of shutting down a plant in regulated counties and 
reallocating its production resources to avoid regulatory compliance. As noted, we consider three 
regional measures for firms’ internal network (local, neighborhood, and the wider area).  
To tease out the regulatory impact on closure decisions of dirty plants, we further define dirty 
plants as those in a dirty industry (i.e., industries that are known to be heavy emitters of criteria air 
emissions). The classification of dirty industry is pollutant-specific and based on Greenstone (2002), 
and described in Table 4. We denote jDirty  as a dirty industry indicator if the industry is classified as 
heavy emitters of any criteria air pollutants in the list of SO2, CO, O3, and TSPs. For each three regional 
network measures, we examine the firm’s internal network effect on closure decisions for affiliated 
dirty plants located in nonattainment counties by interacting the regional network variables with the 
county regulatory control variable and dirty industry indicator. The county regulatory controls and 
firm internal network measures are implemented in one-year lagged fashion, allowing relocation 
decisions for dirty plants in the current year to respond to the stringent local environmental regulation 
in the past year. Because a firm may have plants located in local, neighborhood, and wider areas, their 
joint network effects may influence site choices of affiliated dirty plants in regulated counties. We add 
all three network effects and their interaction terms into one specification by representing the 
structural part of the probit model as follows: 
 
+21 1 1 22 1 1
23 1 1
it j ct ijct j ct ijct
j ct ijct
X Dirty Reg LocalNet Dirty Reg NbrNet
Dirty Reg WideNet
  

   
 
    
     (3) 
The coefficients of interest, 21 22 23( , , )   , measure the effects of different regional networks by 
comparing location responses of dirty plants with those of clean plants when both types of plants are 
located in counties with strict environmental regulations. One may expect that 21 22 23( )    , 
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indicating the heterogeneous regional firm internal network effects on closure choices of dirty plants 
relative to clean plants in response to local regulatory compliance.  
Next, consider a plant i  that is located in a nonattainment county c, as depicted in the lower 
panel of Figure 3. To avoid environmental compliance, the parent company of plant i  may consider 
shutting it down. The probability of shutting down plant i  may be influenced by the number of 
affiliated plants located in counties that share borders with county c—in particular, the number of 
affiliated plants located in unregulated neighboring counties. Thus, we consider a variant specification 
with the joint effects of different regional networks varying with exposure to regulations, as follows, 
   
+
31 1 1 32 1 1
33 1 1 34 1 1
it j ct ijct j ct ijct
j ct ijct j ct ijct
X Dirty Reg RegNbrNet Dirty Reg UnregNbrNet
Dirty Reg RegWideNet Dirty Reg UnregWideNet
  
 
   
   
     
       (4) 
The coefficients 31 32 33 34( , , , )     capture how the regional firm’s internal network in regulated and 
unregulated counties would affect the shutdown probability of an affiliated dirty plant relative to that 
of a sibling clean plant, both of which are located in the same regulated county c. One may expect that 
31 32 33 34( )      , suggesting the different effects of regional network by the variations in 
environmental exposure. Moreover, one may expect 32 34( 0)   , indicating that the regional 
network in unregulated counties provides a potential channel of reallocating resources from dirty 
plants in regulated counties to sibling plants in nearby unregulated counties. In addition, the effects of 
regional firms’ internal networks on plant death declines as the distance of the network to the regulated 
plant rises. The signs of 31 33( , )  , however, are ambiguous, because resource reallocation from one 
dirty plant in a regulated county to its siblings in other regulated counties would not help the firm 
escape from environmental compliance. 
5. Results 
We start by presenting results on whether multi-plant firms are more likely to close a plant than single-
plant firms in response to local environmental regulatory control. We then show how regional firms’ 
internal networks are involved in affecting closure decisions of dirty plants in relation to clean plants. 
The effects of regional firms’ internal network interacting with exposure to environmental pressures 
on plant death are presented. A series of robustness checks on model specifications, sample, and 
alternative measures for firms’ internal networks are considered. 
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5.1 Multi-plant vs. Single-plant Death 
Table 5 reports estimation results for the multivariate probit models of plant death conditional on 
plant and county characteristics. Whereas columns 1–4 are based on the full sample, but vary with the 
choices of fixed effects as noted at the bottom of the table, the last two columns examine the sub-
samples for multi-plant and single-plant firms only, respectively. In all columns, standard errors 
clustered at county level are reported in parentheses, and industry is measured by the three-digit SIC.9  
The results strongly support the hypothesis that plants’ shutdown decisions are positively 
associated with multi-plant status. Specifically, we find positive and statistically significant coefficients 
for multi-plant affiliation status in all columns of Table 5. These estimates consistently suggest that 
being affiliated with multi-plant firms significantly increases the probability of plant death at the 
margin by about two percentage points. This result matches findings by Bernard and Jensen (2007), 
who also conclude that multi-plant firms have greater chances of closing a plant relative to single-
plant firms, conditional on plant and county characteristics.  
Moreover, we are interested in the effects of environmental regulations on plant deaths. When 
splitting the data into sub-sample by multi-plant status, as shown in the last two columns of Table 5, 
there are positive coefficients for the regulatory control. This positive coefficient is statistically 
significant at the 1% level for the multi-plant sub-sample, while it is not statistically significant at any 
conventional level for the single-plant sub-sample. The environmental controls have significant 
impacts on the closure probability of plants affiliated with multi-plant firms, but not with single-plant 
firms. The main focus of this paper is on the heterogeneous responses between multi-plant and single-
plant firms when both groups are subject to local regulatory controls. This heterogeneous 
environmental response is captured by the coefficient for the interaction term between multi-plant 
status and regulatory measure. In all columns with full sample, this coefficient is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Controlling for plant attributes and county characteristics, we 
find substantial differences in plant closure decisions in response to stringent regulations between 
multi-plant and single-plant firms. For plants located in nonattainment counties, and hence 
encountering environmental compliance, a plant that is part of a multi-plant firm has a higher 
shutdown probability than a comparable single-plant firm. This finding suggests that, in compliance 
with strict controls, multi-plant firms are more likely to use the plant closure margin to deal with 
                                                        
9 Alternative standard errors clustered at industry, county, and headquarter level are considered, but do not alter 
our main conclusions. 
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environmental compliance.  
The effects of the firm’s internal network on plant death are examined next. We consider two 
alternative measures: the (log) distant of a plant to its headquarters, and the (log) number of affiliated 
plants located in the same county and in the same industry at time t. There are consistently positive 
and statistically significant coefficients for these two variables across all columns in Table 5. When a 
plant is located further away from its parent company, it is more likely to be shut down, as suggested 
by the positive and statistically significant coefficient for the distance variable. In addition, we find 
strong evidence supporting the positive effect of firms’ internal networks on plant death. The larger 
the number of a firm’s affiliated plants in the same county, the higher probability an affiliated plant 
would be closed. We also add a control for the number of industries that a firm’s headquarters are 
involved with. This coefficient is consistently positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in all 
specifications. Hence, we find that the higher the number of sub-sectors in which the headquarters 
have affiliated plants, the higher the chance an affiliated plant will be closed.  
When closely inspecting the relationship between plant attributes and closure likelihood, we find 
negative and statistically significant coefficients for plant size, labor productivity, and age, indicating 
that the probability of plant closure substantially decreases with these plant attributes. This result 
implies that headquarters are more likely to shut down low-productivity and small-size plants, and that 
older plants are more resilient to exiting pressure. We next consider whether exporters or multinational 
firms are related to the probability of plant closure. As expected, the negative and statistically 
significant coefficient shows that exporting plants have lower probability of exit (by roughly 1.6 
percentage points). This result is consistent with predictions arising from the new-new trade theory 
with heterogeneous firms (e.g., Melitz, 2003), showing that exporters are less likely to exit the domestic 
market than their competing non-exporters. The effect of foreign ownership shows that plants owned 
by foreign firms are less likely to be closed. We further examine the effects of changes in plant 
ownership on plant death. As shown by the coefficient for ittakeover  variable, plants experiencing 
changes in ownership have higher shutdown probability. This positive coefficient is statistically 
significant at the 1% level for all specifications in Table 5. The negative effect of the ownership 
changes on plant closure probability is about two percentage points. One possible explanation for this 
effect is that plants that have changed their ownerships are those that may behave poorly in the first 
place, and hence are vulnerable to negative economic shocks. 
When it comes to the effects of county characteristics on plants’ shutdown likelihood, the results 
vary with the level of fixed effects included in the specification. When state or industry fixed effects 
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are present, the coefficient for local agglomeration variable is positive and statistically significant at 
the 1% level, while the coefficient for local income is positive, but not significant at any conventional 
levels. This piece of evidence suggests that the agglomeration effect raises plant death probability 
through competition in local markets. Property tax and industry county wage rate are measures for 
production costs. The estimated coefficients for these two county-level controls are positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. This result implies that higher property tax and wage rates raise 
plants’ production costs, thereby increasing the probability of death. Similarly, both the county-level 
unemployment rate and road density also display positive coefficients with statistical significance at 
the 1% level. The former result suggests that local unemployment rates lead to plant closure 
probability, while the latter indicates that local infrastructure (perhaps surprisingly) contributes to the 
exit of plants. Lastly, the industry sunk costs, measured by the entry-exit rates as in Bernard and Jensen 
(2007), have negative coefficients. When the industry fixed effects are controlled to absorb the 
industry-level confounding unobservable, the coefficient for the industry sunk cost does not have 
statistical significance at any conventional levels, lending little support on the impacts of entry costs 
on plant exit. 
5.2 Regional Firm Internal Network Effects 
Table 6 reports the estimated probit models for specification (3). All controls listed in column 5 of 
Table 5 are included, but their coefficients are not reported in this table to save space. All columns 
also include a set of year fixed effect, three-digit SIC industry linear trends and state linear trends. 
Standard errors are clustered at count level. 
For all three regional networks—local ( 1ijctLocalNet  ), neighborhood ( 1ijctNbrNet  ), and wider area 
( 1ijctWideNet  )—we document consistently positive impacts of regional networks interacting with the 
dirty industry dummy and county regulation on plant death, as shown in columns 1–3 of Table 6. 
Among all three estimated regional network effects, the neighborhood network has the largest positive 
effect, which is statistically significant at the 5% level. Local and wider-area network effects, on the 
other hand, are not statistically significant at conventional levels. The results are essentially unchanged 
when all three regional network effects are considered simultaneously, as presented in column 4 of 
Table 6. The effect that stands out is that associated with the neighborhood network. The presence 
of sibling plants in neighboring counties increases the probability of a dirty plant being shutdown in a 
regulated county. The local network does not exhibit the same effect: shifting resources between plants 
that are subject to the same regulatory pressure does not help the firm’s environmental compliance 
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strategy. 
5.3 Firm Internal Network Effects by Environmental Pressures 
We further split neighborhood and wider-area networks into those in regulated areas and unregulated 
areas. Table 7 provides the estimated probit models for plant death based on specification (4). In 
column 1 of Table 7, we document a positive coefficient of the interaction term among the dirty 
industry dummy, county regulation indicator, and neighbor network in regulated counties. This 
positive effect is statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating that as more affiliated plants are 
located in neighboring counties without environmental pressures, a parent company would be more 
likely to close a dirty plant in the regulated county to deal with environmental compliance. Conversely, 
we find little evidence of a regulated neighbor network effect. When there are some sibling plants 
residing in neighboring counties also with environmental pressures, then these plants are also exposed 
to environmental controls and thus are not attractive for the purpose of reallocating production 
resources in order to lessen the cost of environmental compliance.  
As the firm’s internal network moves to the circle outside of neighboring counties, the impact 
of the regional network on plant closure is weakened. Column 2 of Table 7 shows a positive (but 
insignificant) coefficient for the wider network in unregulated areas, and a negative coefficient for the 
wider network in regulated areas. The latter is significant at the 1% level. Affiliated plants in 
unregulated areas that are located further away from dirty plants in regulated counties have a weak or 
no impact on closure decisions. Conversely, when the firm also faces environmental pressure in the 
wider area, then this reduces the odds of plant closure in a given regulated county (the associated 
coefficient in Table 7 is negative and statistically significant). The coefficients for the specification that 
includes both neighborhood and wider area networks are reported in column 3 of Table 7. The results 
are essentially the same as in columns 1 and 2.  
5.4 Robustness 
To check the robustness of our results, we re-conduct regression analysis based upon specification (4), 
while considering different sample periods, pollutant-specific nonattainment designations, and an 
alternative model specification with more controls of fixed effects. 
5.4.1 Sample period 
Figure 1 depicts the number of counties per year from 1978 to 2014 with changed nonattainment/ 
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attainment designations. During the sample period of 1990–2008, a substantial number of counties 
changed designation status during the early 1990s and the mid-2000s. The former is due to the post-
CAAA period, while the latter is because of new and strict standards for TSPs and ground-level O3 
implemented around 2004. Thus, we split the whole sample period into two parts: the post-CAAA 
period of 1990–1999 and the new standard period of 2000–2008. For each restricted sample period, 
we re-conduct the probit model in specification (3). Table 8 reports the corresponding results. In the 
post-CAAA period, as shown in columns 1–3 of Table 8, the positive effect of firms’ internal networks 
on plant death in unregulated neighboring counties remains statistically significant at the 1% level. 
During this period, in response to local regulatory control, headquarters are more likely to close dirty 
plants and shift production to other affiliated plants in the nearby neighboring counties, which are 
free from environmental regulations. Moreover, a negative and statistically significant coefficient for 
firms’ internal network in wider areas without environmental pressures is again found. With more 
siblings in regulated areas further away from the focal dirty plant, the likelihood of shutting down in 
response to local environmental compliance declines.  
In the new standard period, as shown in columns 4–6 of Table 8, coefficients of neighbor 
network in unregulated counties are positive and statistically significant at the 5% level, lending 
support to the conclusion that the unregulated neighbor network does impact plant death. There is 
little evidence on the negative effects of the wider network in regulated areas on closure decisions of 
dirty plants. 
5.4.2 Pollutant-Specific Regulation 
Figure 2 depicts the number of counties with changed designation status for each criteria air pollutant 
under the CAAA. The pattern varies with pollutant. The changes of SO2-specific status mainly occur 
in the later 1970s, and are stable during the sample period of 1990–2008. For CO, there exist 
substantial changes in designations during the post-CAAA period of 1990–2002. For O3 and TSPs, 
variations in designations mainly appear in the early 1990s and mid-2000s. 
We consider a pollutant-specific regulation and pollutant-specific dirty industry indicator. Let 
pDirty  be pollutant-p-specific dirty industry dummies, following Greenstone (2002). Let 1cptReg   
denote pollutant-p-specific county nonattainment status at t-1. For each pollutant p   {SO2, CO, O3, 
TSPs}, the following variant specification is considered: 
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       (5) 
where the firm’s internal network variables are defined as before.  
Table 9 reports the probit model estimates on plant death during the whole sample period of 
1998–2008. Columns vary with pollutant type. In response to SO2-specific regulation, the wider 
network in unregulated areas raises the shutdown probability of dirty plants relative to that of clean 
plants. This corresponding network effect in unregulated neighboring counties is negative but 
statistically not significant. When it comes to CO- and O3-specific nonattainment designations, we 
find positive coefficients for the network in unregulated neighboring counties. These positive 
estimates are statistically significant at the 10% level for CO and the 1% level for O3. This finding 
suggests that dirty polluters may respond to regulations by shifting resources to other affiliated plants 
in the unregulated neighboring counties and then close dirty plants that are subject to CO- or O3-
specific regulatory controls. For the wide area network in regulated areas, the effect is negative and 
statistically significant for O3-specific nonattainment regulation. Lastly, for TSPs the significant effect 
that emerges concerns the regulated neighboring counties: the presence of sibling plants in such 
counties actually reduces the shutdown probability of a dirty plant facing regulatory pressure.  
5.4.3 Alternative Model Specifications 
Instead of the probit model, here we estimate a linear probability model of plant death using ordinary 
least square (OLS) regressions that include additional fixed effects (for the county or for the plant). 
By controlling for unobserved county or plant heterogeneity, this alternative model specification 
further helps tease out the causal effects for the role of the firm internal network on closure decisions 
of dirty plants in response to local tough environmental controls. Table 10 presents the OLS results 
of the triple interaction terms among the dirty industry dummy, one-year lagged county regulation, 
and one-year lagged firm internal network. 
Controlling for county or plant fixed effects, the estimated coefficients for the triple interaction 
of firm internal network in unregulated neighboring counties are positive and statistically significant, 
while the estimated coefficient for the triple interaction of firm internal network in regulated non-
neighboring counties are negative and statistically significant in most cases. These OLS estimates are 
therefore largely consistent with those reported for the probit models.  
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6. Conclusion 
In this paper we examine the role of firm structure in determining plant death in response to 
increasingly stringent environmental regulation while controlling for plant attributes, headquarter 
network, local agglomeration, and county characteristics. We find strong evidence of heterogeneous 
responses to the stringent environmental control between multi-plant and single-plant firms. Multi-
plant firms have greater flexibility to respond to strict environmental controls. We find that plant 
closure is a significant margin of adjustment for multi-plant firms. They are more likely to close 
affiliated plants located in counties with stringent environmental regulations—in particular, they are 
likely to shut down plants located far away from the parent company or locations with many other 
similar plants in the same county. Moreover, in response to regulatory pressure, the structure of a 
firm’s internal network matters. Multi-plant firms are more likely to close a plant in regulated counties 
when they possess affiliated plants in counties neighboring the regulated county. This effect is mainly 
driven by the firm’s internal network in unregulated neighboring counties, which is measured by the 
number of affiliated plants in neighboring counties free from environmental regulations. 
This paper extends our understanding on the heterogeneous regulatory impacts of environmental 
regulation on firms’ production activities. Our results show that multi-plant firms do exercise their 
greater flexibility in adjusting to tough environmental regulations, relative to single-plant firms. 
Increasing awareness of this fact makes the design and assessment of environmental policies more 
challenging. On the one hand, similar to emission leakage across borders, we may experience the 
unintended consequence of emissions leakage across affiliated plants through the internal network of 
multi-plant firms. On the other hand, the ability of firms to shift production activities across plants 
can play a positive role by providing a cost-efficient avenue for environmental compliance, one that 
can reduce emissions while minimizing the impact on production and employment. Inevitably in such 
circumstances, the impacts of policy may contribute to spatial inequality, echoing concerns similar to 
those arising from the impact of trade liberalization and the role of multinational firms.  
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1. Number of Counties with Nonattainment Status and Number of Counties with Changed 
Status for Any Criteria Air Pollutants. (Note: the left Y axis is for the number of any NA, while the 
right Y axis is for the number of changed status.) 
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Figure 2. Number of Counties with Pollutant-Specific Nonattainment Status and Number of 
Counties with Changed Status. (Note: the number of pollutant-specific NA refers to the left Y axis, 
and the number of changed status refers to the right Y axis.) 
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Figure 3. Heuristic Map of Affiliated Plants. (Note: the upper chart depicts the location of some 
affiliated plants; the lower chart depicts the firm internal neighborhood network by exposure to 
regulation in terms of nonattainment designations.) 
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Figure 4. Average County-level Plant Death Rate by Multi-Plant Status, 1990–2008. (Note: death 
rate is computed as the number of death plants divided by the number of existing plants by multi-
plant status. Nonattainment is set for any criteria pollutants.) 
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Table 1. Variable List 
Variable Definition Source/Explanation
 Plant Characteristics  
Sales value of deflated sales NETS 
Employment number of employment NETS 
Labor productivity value of deflated sales per labor employment NETS, calculated 
Age current year subtract first recorded year NETS, calculated 
Export status equals 1 if exports, and 0 otherwise NETS 
Foreign ownership equals 1 if owned by foreign firms, and 0 otherwise NETS 
Multi-plant equals 1 if there exists one other plants with the same headquarters, and 0 otherwise NETS, calculated 
Death equals 1 if current year is the last business year, 0 otherwise NETS, calculated 
Takeover equals 1 if it changes headquarters, and 0 otherwise NETS, calculated 
Distance to Hdq the log distance of a plan to headquarters NETS, calculated 
Multi-industry the  number of two-digit SIC industries in which headquarters have plants NETS, calculated 
  the (log) one plus the number of affiliated plants in county c and industry j at time t NETS, calculated 
 the (log) one plus the number of affiliated plants in counties sharing border with county c and industry j at t NETS, calculated 
 the (log) one plus the number of affiliated plants in industry j but outside or local and neighboring areas at t NETS, calculated 
 
the (log) one plus the number of affiliated plants in 
regulated counties sharing border with county c and in 
industry j at time t 
NETS, calculated 
 
the (log) one plus the number of affiliated plants in 
unregulated counties that share border with county c and 
in industry j at time t 
NETS, calculated 
 County Characteristics  
Any Reg equals 1 if NA for at least one pollutant, and 0 otherwise EPA, calculated 
SO2 Reg equals 1 if NA for SO2, and 0 otherwise EPA 
CO Reg equals 1 if NA for CO, and 0 otherwise EPA 
O3 Reg equals 1 if NA for O3, and 0 otherwise EPA 
TSPs Reg equals 1 if NA for TSPs, and 0 otherwise EPA 
Agglomeration the logarithm of one plus the number of plants outside of its own internal network CBP, calculated 
Property tax median real estate tax rates in 2005 ACS 
Road density road length per land area ArcGIS, calculated 
Unemployment rate unemployment divided by labor force BLS, calculated 
Industry-county wage industry-specific annual payroll per employment CBP, calculated 
 Industry Characteristics  
PPI producer price index at two-digit SIC industry BLS 
Entry  birth plants divided by total existing plants Census of Bureau, 
Exit  death plants divided by total existing plants Census of Bureau 
Sunk costs 1-min{entry, exit} Bernard & Jensen (2007), calculated 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max Multi-
plant 
mean 
Single 
plant 
mean           
Deflated Sales 18,579.51 61,657.21 0.00 5,353,243.00 20,273.74 10,597.12
Employment 151.10 456.60 1.00 30,000.00 165.62 82.69 
Sales per labor 132.79 1,384.86 0.00 332,752.30 130.32 144.45 
Age 6.69 5.14 0.00 18.00 6.64 6.94 
Death 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00 0.05 0.02 
Birth 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00 0.05 0.04 
Takeover 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.44 0.56 
Export status 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 0.17 0.27 
Foreign ownership 0.16 0.36 0.00 1.00 0.17 0.09 
Multi-industry 3.05 2.76 1.00 17.00 3.49 1.00 
 1.70 2.02 1.00 41.00 1.85 1.00 
 0.56 1.81 0.00 44.00 0.68 0.00 
 29.56 56.47 0.00 386.00 35.83 0.00 
 0.44 1.57 0.00 42.00 0.54 0.00 
 0.12 0.77 0.00 37.00 0.14 0.00 
 21.14 39.57 0.00 283.00 25.62 0.00 
 8.42 18.35 0.00 166.00 10.21 0.00 
Any Reg 0.56 0.49 0.00 1.00 0.55 0.61 
SO2 Reg 0.04 0.18 0.00 1.00 0.04 0.03 
CO Reg 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 0.18 0.26 
O3 Reg 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.49 0.55 
TSPs Reg 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 0.22 0.27 
 
Note: see text for all variable definitions.  
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Table 3. Mean Value for Plant Characteristics by Firm Structure 
 
 Variable Multi-plant Single plant 
 Any Reg = 0 Any Reg = 1 Any Reg = 0 Any Reg = 1
Observations 338,069 989,772 59,705 222,123 
Deflated sales 21163.99 19969.66 12240.79 10155.31 
Employment 171.26 163.70 92.68 80.00 
Sales per labor  124.81 132.20 141.68 145.20 
Age 7.24 6.43 7.85 6.70 
Death 0.051 0.055 0.018 0.017 
Birth 0.050 0.050 0.042 0.038 
Takeover 0.445 0.434 0.593 0.545 
Export status 0.171 0.173 0.268 0.268 
Foreign ownership 0.166 0.171 0.101 0.085 
Multi-industry 3.475 3.492 1.000 1.000 
 1.742 1.884 1.000 1.000 
 0.560 0.720 0.000 0.000 
 40.104 34.371 0.000 0.000 
 0.208 0.649 0.000 0.000 
 0.352 0.071 0.000 0.000 
 27.742 24.896 0.000 0.000 
 12.361 9.476 0.000 0.000 
 
Note: see text for all variable definitions. 
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Table 4. Dirty Industry List 
 
Industry (SIC codes) SO2 CO O3 TSPs 
Pulp and paper (2611-31) Y Y Y Y 
Organic chemicals (2861-69) Y 
Petroleum refining (2911) Y Y Y 
Rubber and miscellaneous plastic products (30) Y 
Stone, clay, glass and concrete (32) Y Y Y 
Iron and steels (3312-25, 2231-2) Y  
Nonferrous metals (333-34) Y Y  
 
Note: this industry classification is based on Greenstone (2002). 
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Table 5. Baseline Effects Results of Probit Models on Plant Death 
VARIABLES All sample Multi-plant Single-plant
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
Multi-plant status 0.0215*** 0.0216*** 0.0220*** 0.0214***  
 (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)  
1ctReg    -0.0027* -0.0020 -0.0019 -0.0019 0.0014** 0.0006 
 (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
1ctReg    Multi-plant 0.0030* 0.0034** 0.0034** 0.0034**  
 (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016)  
Size -0.0020*** -0.0023*** -0.0019*** -0.0023*** -0.0029*** -0.0005*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
Labor productivity -0.0033*** -0.0061*** -0.0046*** -0.0061*** -0.0069*** -0.0029*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0004) 
Age  -0.0075*** -0.0084*** -0.0094*** -0.0084*** -0.0106*** -0.0012** 
 (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005) 
Export Status -0.0151*** -0.0166*** -0.0153*** -0.0166*** -0.0222*** -0.0022*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0006) 
Foreign Ownership -0.0077*** -0.0068*** -0.0079*** -0.0070*** -0.0077*** -0.0029*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0008) 
Takeover 0.0063*** 0.0060*** 0.0064*** 0.0060*** 0.0076*** 0.0026*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Distance to Hdq 0.0032*** 0.0036*** 0.0034*** 0.0036*** 0.0042*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Multi-industry 0.0014*** 0.0012*** 0.0015*** 0.0012*** 0.0014*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
  0.0117*** 0.0134*** 0.0116*** 0.0136*** 0.0161***  
 (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) 
Agglomeration  -0.0007** 0.0014*** 0.0020*** 0.0024*** 0.0033*** -0.0007 
 (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0010) 
Property tax 0.0069*** 0.0013 0.0013 -0.0011 -0.0019 0.0012 
 (0.0009) (0.0014) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0022) (0.0026) 
Income per capita -0.0001 0.0021*** 0.0020** 0.0025*** 0.0034*** -0.0011 
 (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0011) 
Road density 0.0021*** 0.0029*** 0.0022*** 0.0018*** 0.0021*** 0.0009 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Unemployment rate -0.0001 0.0008*** 0.0008*** 0.0007*** 0.0009*** 0.0002 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Industry-county wage 0.0106*** 0.0047*** 0.0023* 0.0044*** 0.0052*** 0.0004 
 (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0015) (0.0017) 
Industry sunk costs -0.1392*** 0.0108 -0.1132*** 0.0095 -0.0073 0.0592* 
 (0.0110) (0.0241) (0.0120) (0.0241) (0.0299) (0.0313) 
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Observations 1,239,824 1,181,595 1,181,641 1,181,595 971,754 243,273 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0353 0.0461 0.0420 0.0465 0.0313 0.0386 
Year FE N Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry FE N Y N Y Y Y 
State FE N N Y Y Y Y 
 
Note: Dependent variable is a binary indicator of plant death. The coefficients give the marginal effect of 
changing the independent variable estimated from probit models. See Table 2 and the text for variable 
definitions. All control variables, except indicator variables, are in logs. Standard errors presented in the 
parentheses are clustered at county level. Industry dummies are calculated at the three-digit SIC level. *** 
significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level.  
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Table 6. Regional Firm Internal Network Effect on Plant Death 
 
 VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
jDirty × -1ctReg  ×   0.0130   -0.0080 
 (0.0314) (0.0330) 
jDirty × -1ctReg ×    0.0450**  0.0469* 
 (0.0224) (0.0240) 
jDirty × -1ctReg ×    0.0044 0.0013 
 (0.0064) (0.0067) 
     
Observations 971,754 971,754 971,754 971,754 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0341 0.0341 0.0341 0.0341 
Plant Control Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y 
3SIC-Industry Trend Y Y Y Y 
State Trend Y Y Y Y 
 
Note: Dependent variable is a binary indicator of plant death. All controls and fixed effects in column 5 of 
Table 5 are included. Dirty is a dirty industry dummy for any criteria air pollutants. See text for all variable 
definitions. Standard errors presented in the parentheses are clustered at county level. *** significant at 1% 
level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. 
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Table 7. Regional Firm Internal Network Effect by Exposure to Regulation 
 
 VARIABLES Whole period of 1990 -2008 
 (1) (2) (3) 
        
jDirty × 1ctReg   ×  0.0024  0.0134 
 (0.0297) (0.0298) 
jDirty × 1ctReg   ×  0.0909**  0.0999*** 
 (0.0359) (0.0366) 
jDirty × 1ctReg   ×   -0.0279*** -0.0274*** 
 (0.0089) (0.0090) 
jDirty × 1ctReg   ×   0.0142 0.0119 
 (0.0102) (0.0101) 
Observations 971,754 971,754 971,754 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0341 0.0342 0.0343 
Plant Control Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y 
3SIC-Industry Trend Y Y Y 
State Trend Y Y Y 
 
Note: Dependent variable is a binary indicator of plant death. For each column, the coefficients give the 
marginal effect of changing the independent variable estimated from probit models. All controls and fixed 
effects in column 5 of Table 5 are included. See text for all variable definitions. Standard errors presented in 
the parentheses are clustered at county level. *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant 
at 10% level. 
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Table 8. Robustness Checks – Sample Periods 
 
 VARIABLES Post-CAAA period of 1990-1999 New standard period of 2000-2008
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
   
jDirty × 1ctReg   ×  -0.0005  0.0126 0.0103  0.0198 
 (0.0473) (0.0474) (0.0377) (0.0381) 
jDirty × 1ctReg   ×  0.1103*  0.1123* 0.0890**  0.1011** 
 (0.0643) (0.0649) (0.0427) (0.0434) 
jDirty × 1ctReg   ×   -0.0359*** -0.0340***  -0.0172 -0.0189 
 (0.0117) (0.0118)  (0.0138) (0.0140) 
jDirty × 1ctReg  ×   0.0221 0.0223  0.0051 0.0014 
 (0.0143) (0.0144)  (0.0157) (0.0156) 
Observations 499,887 499,887 499,887 471,867 471,867 471,867 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0438 0.0440 0.0441 0.0306 0.0307 0.0307 
Plant Control Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
3SIC-Industry Trend Y Y Y Y Y Y 
State Trend Y Y Y Y Y Y 
 
Note: Dependent variable is a binary indicator of plant death. For each column, the coefficients give the 
marginal effect of changing the independent variable estimated from probit models. All controls and fixed 
effects in column 5 of Table 5 are included. Dirty is a dirty industry dummy for any criteria air pollutants. See 
text for all variable definitions. Standard errors presented in the parenthesis are clustered at county level. *** 
significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. 
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Table 9: Robustness Check – Pollutant-specific Dirty Emitter 
 
 VARIABLES Whole sample period 
 SO2 CO O3 TSPs 
          
pDirty  × 1cptReg   ×  -0.0260 -0.0693 0.0154 -0.0686** 
 (0.0734) (0.0615) (0.0181) (0.0297) 
pDirty × 1cptReg   ×  -0.0744 0.4043* 0.1570*** 0.0447 
 (0.1073) (0.2113) (0.0555) (0.1177) 
pDirty × 1cptReg   ×  -0.0645 0.0185 -0.0272*** -0.0063 
 (0.0411) (0.0346) (0.0097) (0.0218) 
pDirty × 1cptReg   ×  0.0872* -0.0435 0.0105 0.0136 
 (0.0469) (0.0396) (0.0112) (0.0256) 
     
Observations 971,754 971,754 971,754 971,754 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0343 0.0342 0.0342 0.0342 
Plant Control Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y 
3SIC-Industry Trend Y Y Y Y 
State Trend Y Y Y Y 
 
Note: Dependent variable is a binary indicator of plant death. For each column, the coefficients give the 
marginal effect of changing the independent variable estimated from probit models. All controls and fixed 
effects in column 5 of Table 5 are included. Dirty is a dirty industry dummy for any criteria air pollutants. See 
text for all variable definitions. Standard errors presented in the parentheses are clustered at county level. *** 
significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. 
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Table 10. Linear Probability Model for Plant Death 
 
 VARIABLES Whole sample period 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
jDirty × 1ctReg   ×  0.0001 0.0015   0.0014 0.0032 
 (0.0029) (0.0046)  (0.0030) (0.0047) 
jDirty × 1ctReg   ×  0.0098*** 0.0096*   0.0110*** 0.0114** 
 (0.0036) (0.0052)  (0.0037) (0.0053) 
jDirty × 1ctReg   ×    -0.0029*** 0.0009 -0.0029*** -0.0022** 
 (0.0010) (0.0015) (0.0010) (0.0010) 
jDirty × 1ctReg  ×    0.0014 -0.0035** 0.0012 -0.0027 
 (0.0011) (0.0016) (0.0011) (0.0047) 
Observations 1,021,884 1,021,884 1,021,884 1,021,884 1,021,884 1,021,884 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0165 0.2528 0.0166 0.2528 0.0166 0.2528 
Plant Control Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
3SIC-Industry Trend Y Y Y Y Y Y 
State Trend Y Y Y Y Y Y 
County FE Y Y Y 
Plant FE   Y   Y   Y 
 
Note: Dependent variable is a binary indicator of plant death. For each column, the coefficients give the marginal effect of changing the independent 
variable estimated from probit models. All controls and fixed effects in column 5 of Table 5 are included. See text for all variable definitions. Standard 
errors presented in the parentheses are clustered at county level. *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. 
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Appendix 
This appendix describes detailed algorithm for matching plant-level data from different sources. We 
begin with polluting plants reported in the NEI database of the EPA. The NEI database contains 
information about plants that emit criteria air pollutants for all areas of the United States. Since 2002, 
it releases an updated version of the NEI database every three years with the latest version realeased 
in 2008. Plants recorded in the NEI database emit at least one type of criteria air pollutant (i.e., CO, 
SO2, TSPs, NOx, and VOCs).  
Next, we match polluting plants in the NEI database with those that appear in the NETS 
database, using a name and plant identifier matching algorithm. The NETS database assigns the 
DUNS number to identify unique business facilities. The EPA also has information of DUNS 
numbers for some polluting plants, but not all. Approximately 80% of polluting plants in the 
manufacturing industry collected in the NEI database have associated DUNS numbers. However, the 
EPA does not provide further information about how DUNS numbers are reported for polluting 
plants and why some plants have missing DUNS numbers while others have more than one. In an 
attempt to circumvent this shortcoming, we consider a pair of plants from each source as a match, if 
the following series of criteria are satisfied. They must share the same DUNS number and are located 
in the same county. More importantly, for each pair, we check the plant names from each source to 
ensure a match. In the end, this matching procedure narrows to 18,743 unique polluting plants, 
roughly half of manufacturing polluters reported in the NEI database prior to matching.  
We then take these 18,743 matched polluting plants into the NETS database to search for their 
related plants, which are affiliated with the same parent company (i.e., headquarters). For each plant, 
the NETS reports information about its headquarters (e.g., the DUNS number, name, and location). 
In addition, it tracks the headquarters’ DUNS number over the study period. Plants related to the 
matched polluters that appear in the NEI database are found in the NETS database through the 
headquarters’ DUNS numbers. We restrict our sample to plants in the manufacturing industry as 
determined by four-digit SIC codes (between 2000 and 4000). As a consequence, we are left with 
1,610,462 plant-by-year observations from 1990 to 2008, which gives us 153,582 unique plants 
affiliated with 44,069 unique headquarters. Note that the number of headquarters is larger than the 
number of polluting plants because, during the study period, some plants changed headquarters, 
thereby bringing more headquarters and even more affiliated plants to the sample search. 
